British Application to Join the European Economic Community

British Application to Join the European Economic Community

Nevertheless, against the background of the continuing post-war economic problems, and the frosty relationship between Britain and the U.S. after the Suez Canal crisis, MacMillan managed to re-establish the friendly relationship that had existed between Churchill and Truman and bring about the ‘special relationship’ that Churchill always wanted Britain to have with the United States. Consequently, MacMillan even managed to maintain an independent nuclear deterrent for Britain, which thus remained a member of the ‘nuclear club’. As has been pointed out, MacMillan’s policy is still operating today between the U.K. and the U.S.. Thus MacMillan secured Britain’s defence and managed to bring the old Empire to a New Commonwealth, and prevented the ex-colonies from falling into the Communist sphere of influence. As I have said, MacMillan, like Churchill and Eden, believed that Britain was not exclusively European, and that she should maintain her special link with the Commonwealth, the sterling area and the United States. Additionally, alliance with the United States was fundamental to Britain and her interests and security. However, the difference between MacMillan, Churchill and Eden was that MacMillan did not have Churchillian nostalgia, nor Eden’s overestimation of Britain – especially in the face of her weakened economy and the U.S.S.R.!U.S.A’s superpower status. MacMillan was realistic and took the middle ground. Moreover, the Suez Crisis was a lesson that MacMillan took notice of; in other words the transatlantic relationship must be based on consultation and trust.

 

Notes:
1. FO 371/97592, AU 1051/12 (PRO), D.DIMBLEBY and D.REYNOLDS, op. cit., p. 223.
2. W.CHURCHILL’s speech in: N.MANSBERGH (ed.), Documents and speeches on Commonwealth Affairs 1952-1962. (London: issued under the auspices of the Royal institute of International Affairs, Oxford University Press, 1963), p. 423.
3.M.BELOF, The Future of British Foreign Policy. (London: Secker and Warburg, 1969), p. 110.

This is a unique website which will require a more modern browser to work!

Please upgrade today!